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Firstly, I present some of my most important answers to Miščević’s objec-
tions to my 2014 paper which I fully disagree with. Secondly and more 
importantly, I point out that there is a possible confusion or misunder-
standing about the distinction between the object-level (sentence pro-
duced) and meta-level (sentence judged). I argue that competentionalist 
actually confl ates object and meta levels and show the fi nal consequenc-
es of such a confl ation. The ordinarist fi rmly believes that there should 
be a separation between the object-level and meta-level and provides the 
explanation for this. Finally, I briefl y comment on the so-called ‘Route 
Question’, the path from the underlying competence to the central proces-
sor and argue that competentionalist cannot provide an explanation for 
it. The hope is that this discussion brings us closer to understanding the 
difference between the two opposing views.
Keywords: Linguistic intuitions, competentionalism, ordinarism, 
meta-level, object-level, the route question.
1. Introduction
This paper came out of a mini conference with Michael Devitt that was 
held in Rijeka under the title ‘Linguistic Intuitions and Natural Kinds’ 
in April 2017 organized by the Croatian Society for Analytic Philoso-
phy. The part on linguistic intuitions was meant to be a continuation 
of Devitt’s, Miščević’s and Jutronić’s ongoing discussion on linguistic 
intuitions1 and here I present some of my most important answers to 
Miščević’s objections to my 2014 paper. However, my main aim is to 
try to advance the discussion which, in my opinion, is coming to an un-
1 See Jutronić (2012, 2014); Miščević (2012, 2014); Devitt (2014). The literature 
on linguistics intuitions has proliferated greatly. For more references see Jutronić 
(2014) and Schindler (Forthcoming).
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profi table stand still. My hope is that this discussion brings us closer to 
understanding the difference between the two opposing views!
2. Answers to Miščević
Let me start with a simple example. Say a speaker is presented with 
the following two sentences:
 They want to be teachers.
 *They want to be teacher.
If asked, the native speaker answers that only the fi rst sentence is OK, 
or that this is a sentence of his language. His answer is the result of 
his intuitions about his language. It is very important to stress right 
at the beginning that the question under discussion is not whether the 
speaker has the linguistic intuitions (since she obviously does) or how 
intuitions are defi ned, or how reliable they are, but the question under 
discussion is the following: Where do language intuitions come from? 
The discussion is primarily and exclusively over the source of linguistic 
intuitions.
There are two main opposing views on the topic about the source 
of linguistic intuitions, i.e., there is a crucial disagreement what the 
source of linguistic intuitions is. Competentialists (i.e., Miščević) be-
lieve and defend the view that linguistic competence is their source. 
Ordinarists (i.e. Devitt and myself) believe and defend the view that 
linguistic intuitions are not derived from linguistic competence. Intu-
itions do not fl ow directly from competence (says the ordinarist) but 
they are “immediate and fairly unrefl ective empirical central-processor 
responses to linguistic phenomena” (Devitt 2006a: 120). The intuitions 
are mostly the product of experiences of the linguistic world. They are 
like “observation” judgments.
The issue can be put as follows: a) Linguistic competence is the com-
petence to process language; b) Does linguistic competence also come 
up with judgments about language? Miščević agrees that we should 
distinguish these two levels: a) dealing with the proposed sentence, at 
the object-level, and b) reaching the verdict about its grammaticality, 
at the meta-level.
I was prompted by these words of Miščević and in what follows I 
will fi rst comment on Miščević’s answers to me that I fully disagree 
with but my main objective is to concentrate on the distinction that 
Miščević himself makes clear: object-level and meta-level. The main 
aim is to make some steps forward since our discussion about linguis-
tic intuitions has come, as I stressed, to a certain not very stimulating 
stand-still.
In distinguishing the two levels Miščević goes on to comment on the 
litmus analogy from Miščević (2014). I have to include a longer quote 
for the present reader:
Miščević says:
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Let us assume that the person successfully produces the sentence. Is not 
that success like the information about the color of litmus? (2014: 148)
My answer was:
Yes, sure it is—but this is part of the production—either of litmus or of com-
petence—which does not carry with it any judgement! (2014: 148)
Miščević’s answer to the above is the following:
But this is all I need at the object-level. Namely, the ‘parser in the compe-
tence’ analyses the sentence and ends up with some mental equivalent of 
the tree diagram. And this is the main job to be done. If competence is doing 
this, then it plays the main role. And if Dunja admits this, how can she be 
an ordinarist, rather than a competentialist? If Devitt agrees with this, how 
can he be an ordinarist? (2014: 148) 
The above is a very curious conclusion to say the least since there is 
NO disagreement between us of what language parser does! We have 
gone through this point many many times.2 All that this shows is that 
competence plays the main role in production and comprehension of 
sentences. But there is no YES or NO answer in the very production or 
comprehension — competence does not come out with the judgement 
about its own doings. On the contrary, whether competence comes out 
with YES or NO answer is the bone of disagreement and the very dif-
ference between an ordinarist and a competentinalist!
Miščević continues:
Alternatively, further research might show that competence does also issue 
a verdict, and I hope this is what will happen. My reason for thinking this is 
that I think competence participates in other linguistic tasks, in particular 
in immediate linguistic understanding. (2014: 149)
This is even more curious comment since contrary to the previous claim 
that competence does issue a verdict (YES or NO answer) here Miščević 
is expressing a possible hope/wish put in future research that might 
prove that the competence will issue a verdict. Since Miščević’s main 
claim is that competence does issue a verdict how is the future research 
going to help?
Miščević continues:
Let me again state my view. First, in the context of explicit recognition of 
grammaticality, in which the work of the language module starts by simu-
lating the production of the sentence, and continues by the parsing process, 
the analytic work is done by the competence, as Dunja agrees. (2014: 151)
Yes I do, apart from the fact that, once again, the workings of com-
petence are not in question. I disagree also with the phrasing. I would 
not call parsing process as ‘recognition of grammaticality’ but use a 
more neutral term, ‘the production of language strings’.
Then comes the passage where Miščević says: “Further, the general 
intelligence, and its equivalent, the CP, does not read parsing trees. 
Therefore, it cannot reach the fi rst verdict” (2014: 151). But this is ex-
actly what the ordinarist is stressing! What is the route from encapsu-
2 Miščević (2006, 2009, 2012); Jutronić (2012, 2014); Devitt (2006c, 2013).
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lated modular workings of the parser to the central processor? As De-
vitt stresses the explanation would require a relatively direct cognitive 
path from the embodied rules of the language to beliefs about expres-
sions of that language. What could that path be? There does not seem to 
be any direct path from these rules to relevant beliefs.3
Commenting of Levelt’s suspicion of the role of competence in issu-
ing judgements Nenad says:
Isn’t the performance, i.e. the behaviour, of a pianist often a clear window, 
almost a clairvoyant window, on her musical competence (and the same 
for cooking, acting and scoring: Ronaldo’s scoring is a clear window on his 
sporting competence)? (2014: 153)
Surely! But the respective competences are not in question and fur-
thermore they are not the subject of discussion. In other words, Ron-
aldo’s competence is not in the subject of dispute. The question is his 
(our) judgement about his competence. A different matter.
At this point it became clear to me that there is some possible con-
fusion or misunderstanding about the distinction between the object-
level and meta-level and maybe that some progress can be made in our 
discussion if we see what is really going on here. Miščević prompted me 
in that direction with his own observation about the analogy of compe-
tence with police spokesperson.
Miščević says:
Let me stay for a second with the police analogy. The spokesperson com-
ments and says: ‘Joe was killed by Thomas Mair’. That’s an object-level 
statement. ‘And we are quite sure this is how things happened’, she might 
add, either spontaneously, or in response to a question. There, she has 
passed to the meta-level, and there is nothing unusual about it (2014: 151). 
Miščević in criticizing my approach/belief that the main hero for the 
ordinarist is the central processing unit and that CP has access to the 
resulting output of a particular competence, so it does some refl ection 
about the output, i.e., about the data provided by the competence says 
the following:
There are two assumptions behind Dunja’s line of arguing. The fi rst is that 
there should be a sharp separation between the analysis and the verdict, 
the object-level and the meta-level. (2014: 150)
And Miščević thinks that “the report of the (alleged) fact and the report 
about the report’s epistemic standing (that ‘we’ are sure about it) go 
naturally together” (2014: 151).
My question is: Do they go together? And what does ‘naturally go 
together’ really mean? It seems that the competentinalist (Miščević) 
wants to minimize the distinction between the object-level and meta-
level.
3 See the section on the route question.
 D. Jutronić, Intuitions Once Again! Object-level vs. Meta-level 287
3. Object-level vs. meta-level
In what follows I will try to show that competentinalist actually con-
fl ates object and meta levels and I want to show the fi nal consequences 
of such a move. On the other hand, the ordinarist defi nitely believes 
that there should be a separation between the object-level and meta-
level. Intuitions are meta-level phenomena and they do not naturally 
fl ow from object-level. Here are some supporting quotations.
Maynes and Gross say:
But the capacity for linguistic intuitions is a further, indeed dissociable, 
capacity that goes beyond the capacity for language production and compre-
hension. It is one thing to parse or understand a sentence; it is another to 
form an intuition that the sentence is acceptable. (2013: 717)
The psychologist and neuroscientist Barbara Luka says:
Processes of evaluation are not an automatic result of comprehension or 
parsing, but rather require attention. The ability to provide linguistic judg-
ments is also dependent on metacognitive and analytic reasoning capacities 
of individual speakers (2005: 488).
In discussing speaker’s introspective experiences Luka wisely warns 
us that many questions stay unanswered regarding the interaction be-
tweeen linguistic knowledge and the processes required to perform and 
report a linguistic judgement. For example, what is the nature of the 
interaction between sentence comprehension and sentence evaluation? 
Is evaluation of grammaticality an automatic result of parsing? Devitt 
stresses that the intuitions are declarative knowledge, the understand-
ing, procedural and that these are very different kinds of knowledge 
here as elsewhere in our psychology. The behaviors are linguistic per-
formances whereas intuitions are judgments about language. Two lev-
els have been distinguished for sure and the ordinarist provides the 
explantion for this.
What about competentionalists?
Miščević’s previous answer that “the report of the (alleged) fact and 
the report about the report’s epistemic standing (that ‘we’ are sure 
about it) go naturally together” indicates that the two levels are brought 
very close together. Even more, it seems that the object-level and meta-
level are almost confl ated. It is a confl ation of behavior/performance 
and intuitions about behavior/performance. Miščević says that there is 
‘nothing unusual’ about this. But how can one justify and explain this 
confl ation? According to the mentalist conception, linguistic intuitions 
are the product of a modularized language faculty that alone delivers 
the relevant information to mechanisms responsible for judgment. But 
how does it do it? The answer seems to be ‘naturally’ but that is not a 
good or satisfactory answer, especially if we take seriously what phi-
losophers and most importantly psychologists are warning us about4, 
4 See the above quotes.
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i. e. that that not much is known about the mechanisms implicated 
specifi cally in the formation of linguistics intuitions.5
Full discussion would involve the burning question about the route 
from the underlying competence to the central processor and that 
would be a different paper, much more complex one. Nevertheless, let 
me comment briefl y on Miščević’ s and Rey’s attempts at providing the 
answer. Let us call it ‘The Route Question’.
4. The Route Question
Miščević thinks that object-level and meta-level levels come together. 
In his chart the (core) intuition/ judgment is already made by compe-
tence (stage 3 on the fl ow chart below).6 Yes or No answer (presumably 
from stage 3) is simply passed to the central processor (stage 4 on the 
fl ow chart). If the central processor does not add anything then one can 
say that it is in a sense bypassed completely, i.e., does not play any role 
in forming (narrow) linguistic intuitions. Object-level (parsing, compe-
tence decision) and meta-level levels (decision simply passed to CP) are 
not distinguished.
5 On the vexing point that the intuitions might be seemings Maynes and Gross 
say: “The distinction between judgments and appearances is arguably of limited 
signifi cance, however, to linguistic practice. First, in an overwhelming number of 
actual cases of interest to linguists, subjects will judge things to be just as they 
experience them as being. Second, in any event, if we are to make use of seemings in 
theorizing, they must be reported. Thus, a judgment is required after all, albeit to the 
effect that things so seem to one. (Glüer (2009) argues that perceptual experiences 
just are judgments about how things perceptually seem.)” (2013: 716, italics mine). 
Devitt (2010) also argues that there are no such seemings.
6 The chart from Miščević (2104: 149).
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Georges Rey in response to Devitt’s claim that hearing an utterance 
in a certain way is one thing, judging that it has certain properties, ad-
mits that it is true that hearing is one thing and judging quite another: 
nevertheless, Rey comments, sometimes our best judgments are based 
on what you hear. Again near confl ation of object (hearing) and meta 
(judging what is heard) level!
Miščević, and especially Rey, put a lot of stress on competence de-
livering structural descriptions (SD, stage 2 on the given chart above) 
on which (supposedly) judgements are made by the central processor. 
The question that Devitt asks is the following: Suppose that the 
language system did deliver a partial SD (structural descriptions) to 
the central processor, how would the SD’s information ‘fairly directly 
cause’ the intuitions that are the concern of VoC? The question stands 
unanswered. Rey’s answer to Devitt’s question is that this is ‘trivial’. 
He claims that going along with the modularity story, there’s no reason 
that attention can’t be drawn to the informational outputs of a module, 
say, by it simply getting highlighted, i.e., computationally enhanced, 
or sent to a special attention address or something.7 This again is no 
good answer, not to mention no explanation at all, since nobody has 
ever claimed that the output of the competence comes highlighted or 
with some kind of enhanced information apart from simple deliverance 
of SD’s. In other words, nobody has claimed that SD’s come with a sign 
saying “ungrammatical” or “grammatical” or Miščević’s YES or NO an-
swers. What is important for our discussion is that it is evident that the 
object-level and meta-level are confl ated.
On competentialist’s view SD’s are somehow (naturally, not unusu-
ally) miraculously ‘mainlined’ in(to) the central processor. On the or-
dinarist view there is no mystery. The object-level and meta-level are 
kept distinct and here is a very short story. I quote Devitt: “I argue 
that intuitive judgments about language, like intuitive judgments in 
general, are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to phe-
nomena, differing from many other such responses only in being fairly 
immediate and unrefl ective, based on little if any conscious reasoning” 
(2006a: 103). On this view, there is no unexplainable cognitive pen-
etration of the central system or SD being ‘computationally enhanced, 
or sent to a special attention address or something’. The object level 
(competence and the data that it provides) are kept separate from the 
content of the judgment, i.e. intuitions, that are in the central proces-
sor (the meta level). The central processor is the home of inferences and 
judgements, including intuitive ones.
On the fi nal note, it is instructive to quote an interesting and re-
vealing part from the correspondence between Rey and Devitt on the 
very question that is being discussed.8 Rey says that Devitt allows that 
7 The best and the most relevant place for this dispute is Devitt (2013) and Rey 
(2013) but there are also some email exchanges among them available at request.
8 Email correspondence but see also Rey (2013) and Devitt (2013).
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syntactic properties can cause intuitive judgments as responses and 
that Devitt just thinks this is mediated by the person’s central appre-
ciation of some bit of the theory of grammar, folk or otherwise. But the 
Chomskyan (competentionalist) argues there is a more direct route: 
we are so wired that the outputs of the language module more directly 
cause some of our intuitive responses, without the mediation of a cen-
tral theory.
Thus, not only that the object-level and meta-level have been 
brought closely together (which was Nenad’s suggestion) but they have 
been confl ated altogether and moreover fi nally reduced to an innate 
instinct (we are so wired)! This seems to me to be a desperate move, not 
to mention that this is no explanation at all.
5. Conclusion
1. I have argued that most of Miščević’s (2014) arguments to my objec-
tions (Jutronić 2104) are not well founded.
2. In distinguishing and stressing the difference between the object-
level from the meta-level I have tried to show that there is a failure 
from the competentionalist to keep our access to linguistic data provid-
ed by competence (object level) sharply distinct from our alleged access 
to linguistic information provided by competence (Devitt 2010b). There 
is access to data provided by competence on anyone’s view (object-lev-
el)! But the ordinarist rejects the view that we have access to linguistic 
information (meta-level) since this information does not reside in com-
petence. 
3. Competentionalist claims that linguistic intuitions are largely sup-
plied by linguistic competence with the penetration from the central 
processor. Ordinarist claims that the intuitions are supplied solely by 
the central processor and there is no question of the competence being 
cognitively penetrated. The distinction between source of data and in-
formation is crucial to ordinarist’s discussion. The data for judgments 
(object-level) are not judgments (meta-level). Hearing an utterance in 
a certain way is one thing, judging that it has certain properties, an-
other. One might comment that there might not be an abyss, or even 
sharp distinction between the two but one cannot deny that there is at 
least a ‘thin red line’ between the two, and that line makes all the dif-
ference in fi nding out who is right in this debate.
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